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I. – Introduction
An unexpectedly partisan political debate over redistributive tax
measures has recently come to focus on fiscal transparency. In this
debate, fiscal transparency and tax neutrality are often spoken of
interchangeably. They are, however, distinct. Tax legislation is neutral
if it does not influence economic choices. It is transparent if the public can understand how tax burdens are allocated and the reasons for
their allocation. Neutrality and transparency differ therefore not only
in their primary focus but also in the types of evidence that may support assertions concerning them. A feature of a tax system can only
be said to be neutral ceteris paribus, because it is virtually impossible to know in detail how economic behavior will in fact respond to
a tax measure. In contrast, average levels of information about how
the tax law works provide reasonably firm evidence of transparency.
Given these and other conceptual differences, I will argue here that,
while the current debate fails to distinguish transparency and tax neutrality adequately, a fruitful approach to fiscal transparency may be
implicit in it.
Section II surveys the simultaneous emergence of the industrial revolution, popular democracy, and income taxation in Europe and elsewhere, explaining how the very advantages that favored income as a
tax base also created technical difficulties that soon resulted in nontransparent tax design. Section III briefly describes recent political
debates in France, the United States, and elsewhere over tax subsidies
for social policy ends. Section IV explains how United States experts
and politicians have cast doubt on the foundations of the“tax expenditure” analysis of these subsidies. Section V analyzes other reasons
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for a growing interest in fiscal transparency and argues that talk of
tax neutrality in the context of tax expenditure analysis should be
replaced with a better focused understanding of fiscal transparency
based on the ability of the public to understand complex tax measures. Section VI concludes that transparency provides a better analytical tool for some, but not all, fiscal analysis that now employs the
rhetoric of tax neutrality.
II. – The

distinctne ss of tax neutrality

and fiscal transparency

The rise of industrialization and democracy made taxation the
backbone of the modern state. In earlier times, national rulers and big
religions competed with the private sector, owning substantial parts
of the resources within their territory, using those resources without
accountability, and burdening the base of the economic pyramid, a
population that had no say in affairs of state. But industrial democracies today rely on the overt sequestration of resources through taxation, rather than indirect confiscation, largely because they answer to
the public, or wish to appear to do so.
Open government is an essential ideal of democracy. People must be
able to understand, make judgments about, and generally see what is
going on in the corridors of power, for government to have any chance
of being representative. What must be transparent? We sometimes
speak as if transparency requires governmental procedures to be open
to public comprehension but requires nothing of substantive governmental decisions. Transparency, we think, is about process, not outcomes. It is certainly true that government is more transparent if all
concerned can easily see whether it functions in accordance with its
own ground rules. This may tempt us to think transparency cannot
be an issue for tax design. Current arguments about tax transparency
assume, and perhaps also to some extent prove, the opposite: that tax
design, even the fine detail of tax laws, may affect transparency.
With greater access by the public to information and sustained economic growth, fiscal transparency became are more demanding goal.
Duplicative taxes on consumption goods and private transactions were
unpopular because they obscured tax incidence. Governments were
instead virtually forced to tax income, the least controversial indicator of well-being, and a common human attribute in the industrial
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age, rather than land or consumption, which by their nature were more
susceptible to multiple taxation. First in Europe and then elsewhere,
the desire for transparency favored broad direct taxes (Orsoni 1995,
p. 29-30). Economics, the“dismal science,” owes its existence in part to
the desire of early economists to explain fiscal matters to their fellow citizens and thereby to pressure legislatures to make better and
clearer choices in tax design.  (192) Adam Smith, David Ricardo, JeanBaptiste Say, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, McCulloch, John Stuart Mill,
and virtually all economists of the classical period at the beginning
of the nineteenth century devoted roughly a third of their works to
clarifying how taxes of various kinds affected the people they burdened and served.
But what had been a solution to a problem eventually became part
of the problem. The goal had been to measure the new wealth created
by all factors of production – labor, working capital, financial services,
passive investment, and combinations of these. In its early days, income
in the form of wages, profits, and rents was easily measured, and taxing this common evidence of economic success seemed straightforward. Income could be seen by all to track the disparate parts of the
economy even-handedly. But then it became apparent that identifying the costs of producing new income, so as not to tax old income a
second time, required complex accounting rules, many of them somewhat or even very arbitrary. Long-lasting equipment and consumption
items should not be treated as serving only the period of time in which
they were purchased, and so amortization of costs became essential.
Deduction of reserves for future outlays, for example in banking and
insurance, called for further line-drawing. Sophisticated taxpayers
eventually dominated the tax legislative process.
Heavy reliance on tax revenues by states husbanding prosperous
and diverse economies made transparency a test for both the design
and the enforcement of the income tax. There are two reasons for
this. First, the goal of matching tax burdens with faculté or ability
to pay required an ever more probing analysis of how the economy
worked. Second, the intrusiveness of taxation created opportunities
for democracy to undercut due process: legislatures could deny rights

  (192) In our own time, Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, the Virginia School economists
(the latter a Nobel Prize Winner), argued that tax laws might serve a “constitutional” purpose,
making government serve popular will better and avoiding Condorcet’s paradox of democracy.
(Brennan & Buchanan 1980, pp. 1-33, 37; Daunton 2001, pp. 8-10).
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in the process of taxing them. Yet non-transparent lawgivers discovered they could cover their tracks by taking advantage of the public’s
reluctance to find out whether incomprehensibly complex tax rules
were inherently or deliberately so. Because information about the distribution of tax burdens is essential for intelligent exercise of democratic rights, tax design and not only the tax collection process had
become a proper focus for judgments of governmental transparency.
It is rarely deliberate subterfuge by lawmakers that most seriously
undermines fiscal transparency. Sometimes it is the juxtaposition of
similar taxes earmarked for the support of distinct social programs.
For example, taxes based on gross income, like the social security taxes
in France (cotisations sociales  (193)) and the US, make few (in the case
of the CSG) or no adjustments (in the case of the US Social Security
payroll tax) for attributes of the taxpayer like family size or expenses
that contribute to the earning of income. But these are imposed simultaneously and often by the same mechanism, withholding-at-source,
with confusing result (Gravelle & Gravelle 2006).Along these lines, the
French Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances has carefully formulated a critique calling for the system of tax and transfer payments
for social protection to be made simpler, from both the perspective of
the beneficiaries of the system and from that of other citizens (DG
Tresor 2012). As the Mirrlees Review of 2010 described wage taxation
in Great Britain, so can it be said of wage taxation in many countries:
“the rate schedule for earnings taxation as a whole is far more complicated than that for income tax alone, because it consists of many
different components which do not fit together harmoniously. . . . Once
tax credits and benefits are brought into the equation as well, the complexity becomes quite bewildering, and seemingly arbitrary patterns
of effective tax rates proliferate” (Mirrlees 2011, p. 108).
Taxes on personal service earnings, however, face none of the difficulties of measuring non-wage income.They are accordingly much simpler than that of the income tax and their incidence is almost perfectly
  (193) The two principal social security taxes in France are the contribution sociale générale
(CSG) and the contribution pour la remboursement de la debte sociale (CRDS). The CSG has a
very broad base as it applies in principle to earnings and income from wealth. The CSG applies to
service compensation income at a rate of 7.5% and to investment income at 8.2%, but it does make
adjustments for personal living circumstances, e.g., Codevi, livret jeune, livret A, livret d’épargne
populaire). The CRDS is imposed at the much lower rate of .5% of incomes without adjustment
for family benefits or housing allowances. Together, however, the tax burden these taxes impose is
comparable to that of the US social security tax, which is extremely difficult to avoid, and which
makes no adjustment for any personal attribute of employees or the self-employed.
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transparent. In this instance, inexorability of enforcement is at least as
important for the resulting transparency as the simplicity of the tax
design, but the latter is also basic. If there were more adjustments to
liability for these taxes, even perfectly transparent enforcement might
leave the public guessing as to the incidence of the taxes’ burdens.The
same is true of consumption taxes like the VAT, except that it runs
into problems with consumer durables like houses, private jets, and
ambiguous items that both please the user and serve a profit-seeking
enterprise. The contrast between simpler income-sensitive taxes and
the plenary income tax makes it obvious that what first recommended
income taxation has become a hard promise to keep. This leads us to
consider how keeping that promise has also become politicized.
Accordingly, there are many fronts on which tax complexity and
special provisions for worthy needs and private choices make the combination of income and other taxes less transparent or even wholly
non-transparent (Orsoni 1995, p. 29-30, 246-48.). In the next section,
however, we consider a narrowly focused literature on tax breaks for
apparently personal expenses and losses, which seems to have diverted
attention from other problems of tax neutrality and transparency.
III. – Current

partisan approache s to neutrality /
transparency

In one conspicuous part of the general tax policy discussion, special
tax measures for lower and middle-income taxpayers have prompted
an unusually elaborate literature, much of it calling for a retreat from
fiscal interventionism. The usual charge is that tax expenditures
detract from tax neutrality (Parienty, 1997, p. 136-39). For example,
some advocate the removal of la dépense fiscale in all its forms from
French tax laws (Lehérissel 2001), and French ministerial studies of
the horizontal equity and efficacy of l’étât providence in France partly
concur (Batard 2012; Parienty 1995, p. 135-67). These are but a few
contexts in which opponents of wealth redistribution have championed the goal of tax neutrality. Theirs is a different sort of concern
for transparency, but equally appropriate because transparency is of
course instrumental to the preservation and extension of the programs at issue. I will describe a similar range of transparency and
neutrality criticisms in the US in the next section.
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It should first be noted that tax neutrality is not a reliable proxy for
transparency. Tax expenditures are openly non-neutral. They deliberately reward certain forms of behavior. A brazen departure from neutrality can, in some circumstances, detract from transparency – for
example, when the public so takes this departure for granted that it
forgets that it is a departure – but initially, and in the light of how
today’s governments report their finances, tax expenditures remain
fairly conspicuous. There is little danger that they will trick politicians or the public into misunderstanding their relation to the basic
taxing function of government.Their long-term presence, however, can
render them invisible to ordinary taxpayers, resulting in secondary
non-transparency.
Tax expenditures are also not always devoted to providing a social
safety net. Many of them are designed to stimulate the economy or
to provide targeted competitive advantages for particular industries.
In other words, they can be part of a Keynesian strategy of economic
fine tuning.These tax expenditures naturally escape the notice of partisan critics of social insurance, who are also often business lobbyists.
In contrast with the relatively open subsidy some tax expenditures
provide, the French and US tax systems, like many others, includes
permanent incentives for investment by businesses in certain kinds
of equipment, which are tax expenditures because they result in a
mis-measurement of business profits (Orsoni 1995, .p 92-98). There is
a clear parallel in the “accelerated cost recovery system” (ACRS) put
in place in 1981 as part of President Reagan’s aggressively stimulative first amendments of the income tax (Utz 2011, p. 228-34). These
non-neutral elements are highly non-transparent, even when attention is called to them, because one must understand the effect of early
deduction of costs on the nominal tax rate applicable to an enterprise,
in order to see that they stimulate business activity by reducing the
effective tax rates on the profits of that activity.
It is beyond my expertise to assess the merits of the French neutrality debate. One wonders whether the contributors from the left
and the right are even talking to each other. The values the opposing voices celebrate, however, have less to do with neutrality and more
with transparency, and in that regard there is an almost perfect parallel between the French debate and that in the United States.
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debate over tax expenditure s

In 2002, President George W. Bush’s proposed budget included the
statement that “the Administration believes that the concept of ‘tax
expenditure’ is of questionable analytic value.” This set off a flurry of
comment, some purely partisan but some of a more technical nature.
It was, after all, a surprisingly technical comment to come from the
White House, which must in accordance with 1974 legislation identify
all implicit subsidies and incentives that lurk in the facially neutral
tax laws of the country. Nonpartisan critics had long since pointed
out that to distinguish true tax rules from rules that camouflage subsidies, we must agree on a“baseline,” or list of matters to be covered by
tax rules that are not extraneous to the proper measurement of what
is taxable.The baseline used in US tax expenditure analysis has always
been disputed, and official attempts to specify it have been incomplete
or ambiguous (Bartlett 2001, p. 414-17). Bush’s words were nonetheless
a political salvo. Most observers understood them as aimed at political
opponents who were critical of the generosity of new tax rules favoring manufacturers and intellectual property firms.The following year,
his budget contained the milder statement that“[t]he Administration
believes the meaningfulness of tax expenditure estimates is uncertain and that the ‘tax expenditure’ presentation [in the presidential
budget] can be improved by consideration of alternative or additional
tax bases” (U.S. Budget 2002, p. 95).
It must be noted that the president’s budget is only a proposal and
that Congress inevitably formulates its own, often very different, budgetary legislation. For this reason, the Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation, which serves both Houses of Congress and whose traditional role has been to negotiate a compromise between conflicting
fiscal legislation passed separately by the two Houses, speaks with
greater influence than the president on the subject of tax expenditures (Hungerford 2011). The Joint Committee, as we will see in a
moment, has now taken its own stand on how tax expenditures should
be identified.
The inventors of the term“tax expenditures,” widely used in the US,
were Stanley Surrey and Paul McDaniel (Surrey & McDaniel 1985).
They came up with it in response to what they believed was nonpartisan confusion in Congress over the nature of incremental changes in
the tax laws, primarily in the income tax laws. It seemed to them, or so
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Paul McDaniel once told me, that legislators of all parties and interests at the time often misunderstood the nature of tax provisions they
enacted, sometimes believing the income tax base had no structural
core, so that spending and taxing were not at all distinct functions
(Wolfman 1985). In other words, Surrey and McDaniel were concerned
with transparency and not with neutrality, or at least not with neutrality alone. Surrey thought all tax expenditures should be expunged
from the tax laws, while McDaniel merely advocated making it clear
that tax expenditures were subsidies, and not a proper part of the
measurement of the tax base.
1.  The choice of the SHS definition of income as a baseline
The design of the income tax compels us to distinguish rules for
measuring income from extraneous rules. This is the baseline problem mentioned earlier essential to the income tax, despite the emphasis they placed on its distinctness from tax expenditures. Strangely,
Surrey and McDaniel were reluctant at first to say what they thought
the baseline should be. They eventually settled on the Schanz-HaigSimons (SHS) definition of income, modified in certain respects, as the
standard on which “the structure of the income tax proper” rests and
as establishing the content of a “normal” income tax system (Surrey
1973, p. 6). Simons, who was not at all concerned with tax expenditures
as such but sought to combat the influence of the ability-to-pay doctrine, associated himself with the earlier work of Georg von Schanz
and Robert Haig, who had rejected utility-based definitions of income
as unacceptably subjective (Simons 1938 passim). SHS not only avoids
reliance on the welfare economic conception of benefit, it also bravely
puts all its eggs in the basket of objective economic power and market valuation. Going well beyond the ideas of Schanz and Haig, Simons
defined income as the sum of a person’s net savings or investment plus
net consumption over a given period of time.
Among the apparent consequences of this definition are: (1) the possibility that total national income will be less than the sum of individual incomes, because the latter may double-count increments of
national (Warren 1980, p. 1084), (2) the superiority of accrual measurement of income and the indictment of taxing only realized gains,
(3) the inclusion of gifts in the recipients’ income, (4) deduction of all
losses, whether personal or arising in an income-oriented activity, and
(5) inclusion of unwanted benefits in the income of employees and even
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of members of the public. Simons, without much explanation, excused
real-world tax systems from (2).  (194)
The U.S. tax policy community has largely revered Simons’s work
without taking its scathing opposition to utility analysis seriously
(Fleming & Thuronyi 2008, p. 450-61; Utz 2002, p. 914-17). Paradoxically,
some regard SHS as supporting the utility-based ability-to-pay tradition in income taxation (Graetz 1987; Kaplow 1996). Simons’s brain
child, de-coupled from its original purpose and meaning, lives on therefore has acquired a meaning he never intended. Some economists think
SHS defines economic income, and point out that it contrasts boldly
with income as defined by the US and many other income tax system
(Slemrod & Bakija 2008, p. 58-62).
2.  Grounds for misappropriating SHS as the baseline
There is one notable reason for the survival of SHS in this totemic
rôle. In order to prove his point that utility theory is unnecessary
baggage, Simons had to show that an objective view of income corresponded closely to the then current conception of income, embodied
in the U.S. income tax laws of the 1920s and in the European income
tax regimes that so heavily influenced them. He was clearly thinking
of both models, as his long chapter on Prussian and other German tax
theorists demonstrated. But his main point of reference was the U.S.
tax system of his day. What authority SHS still has, in other words,
is just that of a streamlined version of our tax system, as it existed
before becoming festooned with tax expenditures.
The modifications that convert SHS income to the very different
income that is subject to the US income tax are not trivial. They are
nevertheless taken for granted in tax expenditure analysis (Surrey &
McDaniel 1985, p. 3-4). The most important departure from SHS is
that“unrealized” income from property dealings is not included in the
tax base. In most cases, this means that the appreciation of property
is not taken into account as income until the owner chooses to sell or
exchange the property for cash or other property. Advocates of tax

  (194) Simons was similarly casual in his concession that real-world tax systems might, e.g.,
exclude gifts from income. A close reading of his argument suggests that he wanted to persuade the
reader that an objective, as opposed to a utility-based, approach to defining the income tax base was
consistent with the broad design of the US income tax had developed in the U.S., even if it should
be necessary to“excuse” deviations of actual law from the ideal without giving any reason for doing
so. Simons 1938, p. 100, 207-08; Utz 1993, pp. 12-14, 96-99.
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expenditure analysis take for granted that other modifications, like
the use of arbitrary depreciation schedules for business property, are
also faithful to the SHS standard, although Simons and his antecedents said little about this. Today, economists would presumably consider“economic depreciation” to be part of the definition of economic
income, although this measure of asset wear-and-tear is probably more
rapid than the straight-line method tax expenditure analysis treats
as the default norm. A third unmentioned deviation is the SHS definition’s failure to notice the time value of costs and profits that are
delayed or accelerated or to tax implicit interest and income from the
use of investment assets by their owners.
Without attacking SHS as such, Boris Bittker was the first to
object that no such norm is universally recognized (Bittker 1969).
More recently, others have developed the theme of the non-existence of a normal tax system with further arguments and examples
(Thuronyi 1988; Kahn & Lehman 1992; Bartlett 2001). Meanwhile, tax
expenditure sympathizer Michael McIntyre advocated a more flexible approach to distinguishing revenue-raising from spending aspects
of the income tax (McIntyre 1980). Separately, the Reagan Treasury
Department adopted a revised understanding of tax expenditures by
specifying a two-part criterion for them, based ostensibly on the work
of Seymour Fiekowski (Fiekowski 1980, p. 214), then in the Treasury
Department’s Office of Tax Analysis.The criterion replaced the notion
of a normal income tax with a“reference tax” criterion. It singled out,
within the existing tax law, all exceptions to general rules, and then
narrowed the field further by counting only those “subsidies” as tax
expenditures that could have been assigned to an existing agency
other than the IRS to administer.
3.  McDaniel’s response to recent
criticisms of the tax expenditure doctrine
Against this background, McDaniel in a recent essay grappled with
the details of tax expenditure analysis, arguing still for the normative
status of the modified SHS baseline that had been used consistently
for decades, and which a 2008 announcement by the Joint Committee
Staff threatened to revise significantly (McDaniel 2012).Yet, as he correctly pointed out, the 2008 approach differed only slightly from the
older approach, which he continued staunchly to defend. Indeed, there
were only two differences.
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The Joint Committee on Taxation staff analysis distinguishes two
categories of tax expenditure: tax subsidies and “tax-induced structurally distorting” expenditures (T-ISD). On the new approach, a tax
subsidy is recognized by two characteristics: as an exception to a general rule of the income tax and as serving a purpose within the scope
of another federal agency’s mission. But as McDaniel also pointed out,
tax credits are never exceptions to general rules, unless every credit is
an exception to the general rule that the income tax is a function of
taxable income, or in other words, an exception to the general rule that
there are no tax credits. In this respect, the new methodology did little to advance the tax expenditure enterprise.
McDaniel also argued that the very description of T-ISD is self-contradictory, because a structural feature of the income tax cannot be
a tax expenditure. More interesting for a wider audience is what the
new methodology has to say about tax “deferral,” the postponement
of income taxation of U.S. corporations’ controlled foreign subsidiaries’ income until repatriation. The JCT Staff Report, implementing
the new tax expenditure approach, removed deferral from the 2008
Tax Expenditure Estimates, without specific comment.The distorting
effect of deferral is “well known” because deferral is a benefit to U.S.
multinational corporations only if their subsidiaries derive income in
low-tax jurisdictions. But far more interesting is McDaniel’s comment:
“In my view, the principal [sic] of capital export neutrality . . . is a
much more powerful principle in the international context than is the
separate treatment of corporations and shareholders developed primarily in the domestic context” (McDaniel 2012, p. 25).To unpack this
a little: McDaniel is arguing that deferral is not structural, because
it depends on the recognition of the separateness of corporations
and their subsidiaries, which is not justified as a matter of policy for
trans-border transactions, but that capital export neutrality does provide a normative and hence presumably structural ground for deferral.
Finally, McDaniel assailed the new approach for subtly importing a
normative conclusion into tax expenditure analysis under the mantle
of what he considers a non-structural feature of existing U.S. tax law.
He may well have the better view of what is structural and what is not.
(I would certainly agree with him about the transfer of corporate separateness from the domestic to the international context.) But as his
own reference to capital export neutrality reveals, SHS does not help
us in classifying this feature of the income tax as structural vel non. If
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the historical longevity of a feature of the income tax is what makes it
normative – SHS primarily has history on its side – the long-standing
link between deferral and the separateness of parent and subsidiary
corporations should pass muster.And so, McDaniel’s’ response to deferral acknowledged that arguments about normal income tax structure
turn on tax policy arguments of another sort, here on the merits of
capital import neutrality.
V. – Growing

intere st in fiscal transparency

Despite the subtlety and care with which sophisticated commentators discuss tax expenditures, differences of opinion have been polite
and laconic, generating little heat. But the issues themselves, if my
brief survey is correct, have been obscured by the wrong theoretical
categorization: tax expenditures are criticized for their non-neutrality,
a characteristic they undeniably have, but their real fault is that they
render income tax laws non-transparent, not that they destroy their
neutrality. Deliberate fiscal interventionism always renders a tax system non-neutral, unless taxpayers decline to use its benefits, because
tax expenditures target certain types of economic choice for tax favoritism. What concerns those who criticize tax expenditures is that are
hidden from the electorate, even if made public by separate listing in
governmental budgets and in nongovernmental organizations’ publications like those of the Organization for Economic Co-operating and
Development (OECD 2012).
The tax expenditures most often criticized – special tax benefits for
home ownership, child-rearing, retirement savings, and so forth – are
indeed not straightforward culprits under the rubric of neutrality.Two
important examples in the United States, the deductions for medical expenses and for charitable contributions, can be defended as necessary for horizontal equity, i.e., the like treatment of similarly situated taxpayers, because amounts deductible for these purposes are not
“preclusively” consumed by the taxpayer (Andrews 1972; Utz 2012, p.
1216-20). If tax expenditures are neutral because they properly play a
role in the correct measurement of income, they may still deserve to be
criticized as collectively erecting a hidden system of benefits (Howard
1997), because their effect on the progressivity of the income tax is
obscure to most taxpayers.
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For their non-transparency, however, the“usual suspects” among tax
expenditures attract more attention from experts than do even better
concealed tax breaks for business and investment – again, not only in
the United States but in many first-world countries. The non-uniform
taxation of business enterprises that use different juridical entities as
vehicles is a prime example. Many OECD countries impose lower effective rates of tax on businesses conducted through some types of juridical entity than they do on business directly operated by individuals
(OECD 2012; Kozniewski 2011). Some European countries have gone
to considerably lengths to ensure that the tax laws do not favor corporate debt financing to equity financing (Gaud 2005), and a small number have made dramatic efforts to unify business taxation and remove
rate discrepancies for different types of business entity (de Hosson
2012). But the central fact is that if the effective rate of tax on income
of corporations or other juridical entities is lower than that on the
most affluent individuals, these entities serve as tax havens for their
shareholders, at least if they are not required to distribute their income
annually. As tax theorists all know, a tax delayed is a tax reduced, and
the tax on a shareholder’s interest in the retained earnings of a corporation is delayed and lightened (Kleinbard 2007, p. 167-70).
These highly technical aspects of entity taxation are as well known
to experts as the tax breaks for the middle class that attract all the
attention in the recent partisan commentary on tax expenditures.
Anyone who cares to delve into these matters can be fluent in discussing them after reading a book or two. They all help deprive the
income tax of its neutrality. The point, however, is that ordinary voters are extremely unlikely to undertake the small but, for most people, extremely dull course of study necessary to understand them.The
problems of the income tax are thus problems of transparency, which
just happen to coincide with problems of neutrality.
In practical terms, transparency is not a matter for technical experts
but for the general public. It is they, after all, who need to know in
order to exercise their democratic rights. A simple example from US
tax law will suffice to show how a perfectly explicit rule of tax law can
be far from transparent. The US tax code announces the graduated
marginal rates applicable to individuals’ income in what seems a neutral and conventional manner.  (195) The 2002 tax rate reductions were

  (195) I.R.C. § 1(a).
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roughly 5% per bracket, e.g., the bottom bracket rate dropped from
15% to 10%, and the top bracket from 39.6% to 35%. Given the averaging of the brackets, however, this translated into a larger drop, about
.5%, in the effective rate on taxpayers at the low end of the highest
(now 35%) bracket than for taxpayers in lower brackets.The tax rate
reductions were not transparent – not because they were secret but
because the manner in which the previously existing brackets were
stated provided an opportunity for deluding the public (Appelbaum
& Debeloff 2012).
It is fortunate that this should be the case, because the failure of
tax neutrality by real-world income tax systems is universal and, as
has been mentioned, comparisons of non-neutrality have no empirical
meaning (Shaviro 2010, p. 120-21; Utz 2008). By contrast, transparency is a completely empirical notion, if perhaps hard to assess without elaborate polling of public knowledge. A fiscal system as a whole,
or a specific tax measure in isolation, is transparent if most people
grasp how it works and how tax burdens are distributed.They may not
know whether it leaves sophisticated agents’ economic choices alone or
changes them, destroying neutrality. But even economic experts have
a difficult time identifying and measuring how taxes affect economic
behavior. For the voting public, it is only important that the features
of the tax system should be plain enough for ready comprehension.
The partial overlap between transparency and neutrality, where tax
expenditures are concerned, is misleading. There, the effect on behavior is deliberate and the packaging of incentives and penalties as tax
rules is at best only slightly deceptive. It may become more deceptive as these rules become part of the familiar landscape, but to that
extent, the same rules probably also disturb neutrality less and less,
given the adaption of economic agents across the full economy to what
were initially isolated changes in economic choices.
VI. – The Limits

of

Neutrality Analysis

As we have seen, deliberate interventionism is not the only means
by which tax neutrality can be lost. Income tax systems are particularly vulnerable to non-neutrality with respect to debt and equity
interests in business ventures. It is relatively easy, but not costless,
for investors in a business enterprise to disguise part of their investment as loans. That they do in fact do this accounts for a significant
bruylant

TRAPRIGOU-proef3.indd 34

9/07/14 18:54

transparency and taxation

35

amount of investment banking activity.Tax authorities, however, must
struggle to prevent the distinction between debt and equity, in order
to treat interest on loans to businesses differently from distributions
of profits to the owners of a business.  (196) Otherwise, capital-intensive businesses (with their greater ability to deduct“interest” on loans
from owners) would enjoy a tax advantage in their competition for
investors’ money over other businesses, like those in the service sector.
Neutrality thus requires that debt and equity be treated differently
but also that taxpayer response to this should be curbed. In other
words, to prevent taxpayers from changing their behavior in reaction
to the tax law, the tax law must intervene to prevent a different kind
of reactive behavior.
In this struggle over debt and equity, all income tax systems lose their
neutrality.The costs the tax law inflicts on the private sector appear to
be substantial deadweight losses. (Actually, we cannot be sure, and so we
do not know that the tax law is non-neutral in this regard; most observers believe treatment of debt and equity is non-neutral.) Tax experts
nevertheless think that some tax systems find better solutions than
others to this problem.“Better” in this context must mean something
like “less non-neutral.” Unfortunately, there is no way to measure this.
The measurement of degrees of neutrality or its opposite is a theoretical chimera. It is possible for economic models to show us what neutrality would look like, if we knew all the consequences of every economic
agent’s behavior, but we do not and cannot get that information about
the real world (Shoven & Whalley 1992).The economic models show us
a Platonic ideal that we cannot operationalize.
A system can be more or less transparent, but we have no metric for
saying that a system can be more or less neutral (Utz 2008). From this,
it follows in part that we cannot speak on any but intuitive, non-empirical grounds, of improvements in the neutrality of a tax system.
Because transparency is a question of how easily the public and others can understand a tax system’s consequences, comparative degrees

  (196) In France dividends are not deductible by entities that pay them but that the shareholders
or other owners are allowed to exclude from their income 40% of the dividend amount.This achieves
a kind of integration of the tax burdens of entity and owner, but it leaves the better treatment of
loans to an entity intact. The French tax authorities must find other ways to deter owners from
disguising contributions to corporate capital as loans. In the US, the government tries to distinguish
debt from equity on a case by case basis, but the result is haphazard because of the sheer complexity
of this enforcement strategy (Shaviro 2010, p. 35).
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of transparency are not as empirically obscure as neutrality, or a fortiori comparative levels of neutrality.
VII. – Conclusion
The difficulty of the empirical assessment of tax neutrality makes
it inevitable that we sometimes fall back on tax transparency as a
proxy. Others and I have argued elsewhere that neutrality is well-defined only within economic models and that the real-world offers no
natural metric for degrees of neutrality (Beltrame & Mehl 1984, p. 31415; Orsoni , p. 247; Shaviro 2009, p. 120-22; Utz 2008). By contrast,
transparency is a completely empirical notion, which we can assess
with different levels of confidence by simply polling the public concerning their understanding of the law. A fiscal system as a whole,
or a specific tax measure in isolation, is transparent if most people
grasp how it works and how tax burdens are distributed.They may not
know whether it leaves sophisticated agents’ economic choices alone or
changes them, destroying neutrality. But even economic experts have
a difficult time identifying and measuring how taxes affect economic
behavior. For the voting public, it is only important that the features
of the tax system should be plain enough for ready comprehension.
The partial overlap between transparency and neutrality, where tax
expenditures are concerned, is misleading. There, the effect on behavior is deliberate and the packaging of incentives and penalties as tax
rules is at best only slightly deceptive. Confusing transparency with
neutrality may become more deceptive as these rules become part of
the familiar landscape, but to that extent, the same rules probably also
disturb neutrality less and less, given the adaption of economic agents
across the full economy to what were initially isolated changes in economic choices.
As we have seen, however, tax neutrality does not promise or ensure
tax transparency. This is conspicuously the case when the tax law
allows taxpayers greater flexibility in choosing how their economic
choices are classified for tax purposes. All countries allow businesses
to be conducted using different legal vehicles, which are usually different juridical entities. Even this very general sort of flexibility
obscures the tax treatment of the businesses to many ordinary taxpayers, who have no idea how the tax regimes applicable to these entities differ. In the United States, a conspicuous but narrower example
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is the electivity permitted to partners in allocating items of income,
deduction, loss and credit among themselves (Utz 2002). The flexibility of these arrangements is directly proportional to their complexity,
and their complexity makes them more obscure to non-specialists and
even to business people who do not use the partnership in the ordinary course of their affairs.
In sum, fiscal transparency now has several meanings. The most
often invoked is the transparency of an income tax system free of
tax expenditures. It is true that tax expenditures look like adjustments that are needed for the proper measurement of taxable income,
because they are formulated in similar language and take their place
side by side with these inherently necessary tax rules. They are also
easily identified, and many countries now make the listing of tax
expenditures are normal feature of their budgets, ensuring a measure
of transparency. For the taxpayer’s everyday encounter with the tax
law, however, official publication in a rarely read government document
may be ineffectual.
The design of the income tax poses greater problems for transparency than that of other taxes. The income tax in practice, if not in
theory, invariably distorts economic outcomes, for example, through
the arbitrary element that every scheme for the tax depreciation of
business assets must create. Income taxation of entities detracts from
transparency in an even more systematic fashion because the tax incidence of these taxes is both theoretically and empirically so uncertain.
While these two underlying problems link income taxation strongly
with the types economic distortion just mentioned, remedying them
has not been a political priority (Mirrlees 2010, p. 16-20).
On the other hand, public debate of tax expenditures at the moment,
though reasonably robust, is strongly flavored with partisan political
argument. When transparency is equated with tax neutrality, opponents of social programs argue that the very goals of the income tax
require the abolition of tax expenditures.That equation, however, begs
the question of transparency rather than analyzing it objectively.
Critics of the social safety net do not usually mention the much more
substantial tax expenditures, characteristic of every OECD country,
that subsidize profit-seeking enterprises – accelerated depreciation,
credits for various types of investment, deferral of shareholder taxation on undistributed corporate profits, exemption or lower taxation of
investment gains. On the other hand, critics of these tax expenditures
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as uneven stimulative measures rarely criticize social subsidies improperly cast as tax measures.
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